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Abstract 
We analyze the status of Canadian oil sands and examine future prospects. Our analysis suggests 
sustained activity in the sector in the medium- to long-term even with challenging changes in the 
surrounding economic and policy circumstances (in particular low oil prices and a redoubled commitment 
to more aggressive climate policies by Canada’s provincial and federal governments). However, a 
combination of an expectation of a sustained increase in benchmark oil prices and the expected relaxation 
of transportation constraints will be needed to stimulate significant additional growth in production. We 
provide an overview of the basic production economics, as well as the economics and politics of getting 
product to market by pipeline and rail. A review of environmental impacts of Canadian oil sands 
development reveals significant concerns with respect to air quality, water quality, wildlife and other 
environmental impacts. However, we find that existing research on the environmental and wider social 




The large-scale extraction of unconventional oil resources, including Canadian oil sands, together with 
the exploitation of shale gas (natural gas trapped in shale formations), has significantly reshaped the 
global energy landscape over the past two decades.  Canadian oil sands have attracted significant attention 
because of their rapid growth, their significant share of Canadian exports and foreign direct investment, 
and their greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental impacts. The Canadian oil sands sector 
highlights many of the key issues we examine in economics and, as we will discuss here, the sector 
remains ripe for further research. 
Oil sands are a sub-surface hydrocarbon deposit that contains a type of oil (called bitumen) that is 
mixed with sand, water, and clay. The world’s largest oil sands deposits are in Canada, but there are also 
important deposits in Venezuela, the United States, Russia, and several other countries. Canada’s oil 
sands are concentrated almost entirely in the province of Alberta, with the three largest deposits originally 
estimated to contain up to 1.8 trillion barrels of oil in place (Swart and Weaver, 2012).  Oil sands 
operations produce bitumen - a black, viscous mixture of hydrocarbons - which is denser and higher in 
sulphur than most crude oils produced globally. Oil sands bitumen can either be processed into synthetic 
crude oil for use as a substitute for lighter crude oils or refined directly in complex refineries.  
Commercial exploitation of Canadian oil sands began in 1967, but the most rapid growth has 
occurred since the turn of the century, when oil sands were part of a wider commodities boom in the 
Canadian economy.1  In 2017, oil sands production averaged 2.9 million barrels per day, an almost four-
fold increase over production levels in 2000.2 Between 2000 and 2015, more than 270 billion Canadian 
dollars ($CAD) were invested in Canadian oil sands, and direct employment in the sector grew to more 
                                                     
1 Over the last two decades, the exploitation of Canada’s oil sands deposits has coincided with the dramatic 
rise of oil production from shale, particularly in the United States (see Kilian, 2016, 2017). 
2 Canadian data used in this report are generally presented in cubic meters (m3). One barrel of oil is 
equivalent to 0.1589 m3 of oil. 
3 
 
than 70,000 employees (AER, 2016; PHRC, 2014).  The effects on employment in the broader economy 
were much larger, with Kneebone (2014) estimating oil sands as directly or indirectly contributing 
400,000 jobs in Canada by 2014. 
More recently, the Canadian oil sands industry has been in a period of upheaval. World oil prices 
dropped more than 50% between June 2014 and June 2016, reaching prices that failed to cover the 
variable costs of production for some oil sands production facilities (see, for example, MEG Energy 
2016).3  While oil sands production continued to grow during the downturn, capital investment and 
production growth expectations have both fallen significantly since 2014.  For example, Alberta Energy 
Regulator (2014) forecast bitumen production to grow from 2013 levels of 2 million barrels per day to 4 
million barrels per day by 2023, with $250 billion in capital investment between 2014 and 2023.  In 
contrast, Alberta Energy Regulator (2018) forecast production to reach 3.6 million barrels per day by 
2023, with $160 billion in capital investment between 2014 and 2023. 
This article analyzes the status of Canadian oil sands and examines the sector’s future prospects. 
We start by discussing the key economic drivers of oil sands costs and how they affect supply decisions. 
Then we discuss transportation issues and the challenges of getting oil sands products to export markets. 
We next examine the likely impact of evolving climate change policy - both within Canada and outside - 
on operations, as well as other environmental issues that relate to oil sands operations. Finally, we 
highlight macro-economic impacts and considerations, namely the resource curse and Dutch disease. 
Overall, we find the future prospects for the Canadian oil sands industry to be highly uncertain. 
 
KEY DRIVERS OF CANADIAN OIL SANDS COSTS AND FUTURE SUPPLY DECISIONS 
                                                     
3 The significant weakening of the Canadian dollar against the U.S. dollar during this period cushioned the 
oil sands sector against further competitiveness losses. See Baumeister and Kilian (2016) for an analysis of the 
factors that contributed to the dramatic fall in oil prices. 
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This section identifies the key financial variables that determine costs in the Canadian oil sands 
sector, and thus producers’ supply decisions. We develop project-level cost estimates for the two most 
common extraction techniques -- open pit mining and in situ extraction --  and use them to project future 
supply decisions in response to potential changes in the key variables.4 Following Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994), Mason (2001) characterizes the decision to develop a new resource extraction project under 
uncertainty as an option with a trigger price (the price at which production of a particular project becomes 
profitable), and this is how we frame our analysis. We define our trigger price in terms of the constant 
real dollar West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil price at which a prototypical new oil sands project would 
be expected to earn a 10% rate of return on capital. 
Capital and Operating Costs 
Oil sands projects have significant construction and operating costs. The only open pit mine 
currently under construction, Suncor’s 180,000 barrel per day Fort Hills facility, is expected to cost a total 
of $16.2 billion (Suncor, 2018). In situ projects tend to be smaller and less costly per unit of production 
capacity; for example, the Kirby North project (40,000 barrels per day) is expected to cost $1.35 billion 
(Canadian Natural Resources, 2016).  We use these capital costs as benchmarks for our analysis. 
Operating and maintenance costs in the sector vary significantly across facility and type of extraction 
(Ollenberger et al., 2016; CERI, 2015). Following central estimates from these sources, we assume 
                                                     
4 Open-pit mines tend to be larger, longer-lived, and have higher total initial capital cost per unit of 
production capacity. In situ facilities are smaller in production capacity and have shorter project durations. They  
rely on paired wells, with the first drilled to inject steam to heat the bitumen in the deposit to render it less viscous 
and the second drilled to produce the heated bitumen. In situ facilities generally rely on natural gas more than mines, 
while truck-and-shovel (i.e., open pit) mines rely more heavily on diesel fuel. Evaluating the two project types 
separately allows us to be sensitive to important differences between them in terms of typical time-scales, 
environmental attributes, and cost structures. 
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operation, maintenance, and production-sustaining capital investment costs of $22 and $36 per barrel 
produced for in situ and mining extraction, respectively. 
Product Discounts 
As noted earlier, bitumen is either converted to synthetic crude oil or diluted with natural gas 
liquids and shipped as diluted bitumen for processing in complex refineries. We will focus our analysis on 
diluted bitumen as there are no projects planned which include integrated upgraders (basically a purpose-
built refinery) to convert bitumen into synthetic crude. Like other heavier and higher-sulphur crude oil 
blends, diluted bitumen from oil sands is generally discounted relative to global benchmark oil grades. 
During 2017, the Canadian benchmark Western Canada Select diluted bitumen blend traded at an average 
of $12.77 per barrel below the WTI price, the North American benchmark for light crude; we use this 
value (adjusted for inflation) in our analysis, and allow it to vary for sensitivity analysis.5  The price 
discount is due to differences in quality and geographic characteristics: oil sands diluted bitumen is denser 
and thus more expensive to transport, more expensive to refine, and yields a lower-value slate of products 
than a light, sweet (low-sulphur) crude in the same location (Nimana et al., 2015).  Lower values for 
heavy crude are not exclusive to oil sands bitumen. For example, Mexican Maya crude traded on the US 
Gulf Coast at a $6.98 per barrel discount relative to Louisiana Light Sweet Crude in 2017 (Bloomberg 
data, author’s calculations).  Transportation costs are also reflected in the price discounts for oil sands 
diluted bitumen, with the marginal market being the US Gulf Coast.6 The North American pipeline 
network has been affected by significant congestion, which has contributed to larger than expected 
                                                     
5 We regard this as a conservative approach. The 5- and 10-year average discounts for bitumen relative to 
WTI have been $26.53 and $26.99 per barrel, respectively (Bloomberg data, authors’ calculations). The differential 
has also been higher since November 2017. Thus, we also include a high-differential sensitivity case. 
6 Thus, Gulf Coast access costs $8.63 per barrel via the Enbridge system (National Energy Board, 2018b) 
and $12.75 per barrel via the TransCanada system (National Energy Board, 2018c).  
6 
 
discounts for Canadian diluted bitumen between 2010 and 2014 (Kilian, 2016; Oliver et al., 2014; 
Borenstein and Kellogg, 2014) and again in late-2017 and early 2018.  
Royalties and Taxes  
Among the major costs for oil sands operators are royalties paid to the government (which owns 
oil sands resources) and corporate income taxes. The oil sands royalty regime is a two-stage system. 
Initially, the developer pays the government a price-dependent share of gross revenues until the project 
has produced a cumulative return on capital invested that is equal to the long-term government bond (this 
is referred to as payout), after which the project is subject to higher royalties based on a share of profits 
(Plourde, 2009).  At both stages, the share of production or profits payable as royalties depends on the 
WTI price per barrel in Canadian dollars. With the exception of financing costs, most project costs are 
used to calculate both the payout condition and the net revenue base on which royalties are calculated.7 
In terms of corporate taxes, oil sands producers pay federal and provincial corporate income taxes 
at a current combined rate of 27%; they also benefit from special tax provisions available to all Canadian 
oil and gas production (KPMG, 2015). 
An unresolved issue is whether oil sands production is actually subsidized.  Some researchers 
have evaluated the level of government support by examining tax expenditures provided to the oil 
industry (including oil sands), which they find to be 2 - 3 billion $CAD per year (Sawyer and Stiebert, 
2010; International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2010; Global Subsidies Initiative, 2011).  
Others have argued that the marginal effective tax rate on capital is higher in Canadian oil and gas than 
other industries (McKenzie and Mintz, 2011), suggesting that the combined effect of the current tax and 
royalty regimes has been to shift economic activity away from oil sands. 
                                                     
7 The initial gross revenue royalty rate is 1% when prices are below 55 $CAD per barrel and increases 
linearly to a maximum of 9% when oil prices reach 120 $CAD.  After the project is deemed to have reached payout, 
the royalty payable is the greater of the gross-revenue royalty just described or a share of profits that increases from 
25% (when the WTI price is less than 55 $CAD per barrel) to 40% (for oil prices at or above 120 $CAD per barrel). 
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Environmental Policies  
Environmental policies also affect the costs faced by Canadian oil sands producers, and hence 
their supply decisions. First, prices on carbon are applied through a hybrid policy that has elements of 
both a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade regime (Leach, 2012). Regulations in place through 2017 provided 
an output-based allocation of emissions credits based on each facility’s historical performance.  In 2018, 
the output-based allocations changed to a benchmark-based system under which firms receive credits 
based on the performance of the 25th percentile producer, with separate allocations for in situ and mined 
bitumen production.8 Credits are bankable and tradeable. If firms have insufficient credits to cover their 
emissions, then they may purchase credits from another firm, make a payment to the government in lieu 
of emissions reductions, or purchase regulated emissions offsets within Alberta.  The possibility of 
compliance through a payment to the government sets the carbon price in Alberta.  From 2007 through 
2015, this price was 15 $CAD per tonne. The price was increased to 20 $CAD per tonne in 2016 and to 
30 $CAD per tonne in 2017. Importantly, carbon charges and emissions abatement costs may be deducted 
from revenues in calculating both the royalty and tax base, implying that such costs are partly shared with 
the federal and provincial government. 
Oil sands facilities are also responsible for the reclamation of their sites after extraction has been 
completed.  Based on a study by the Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI 2015), which assumes a 
reclamation cost that is equivalent to 2% of total capital expenditures, we assume that the future cost of 
reclamation is $CAD 0.25 per barrel for all production. 
Results: Prospects for Future Oil Sands Supply 
The future viability of oil sands production depends primarily on the expected evolution of global 
oil prices and low-cost access to markets. Using a discounted cash flow model of two prototypical oil 
                                                     
8 One of the authors of this article, Andrew Leach, chaired the Government of Alberta’s Climate 
Leadership Panel, whose recommendations were largely adopted by the government (Leach et al., 2016). The 
updated regime in Alberta (2017) forms the basis for our analysis.  
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sands facilities (one in situ and one mine) that produce diluted bitumen, and based on the assumptions just 
presented, we estimate the costs of new oil sands production. We then use these costs to estimate the 
critical (or trigger) oil price at which new production would be viable.9 The trigger prices that we derive 
are substantially higher than realized prices for much of 2015-2017, with the bitumen mine requiring 
revenue levels that would be expected with WTI prices of $84.62 per barrel in order to earn a nominal 
rate of return of 10% on invested capital, while the trigger price for the in situ plant is $58.06 per barrel 
WTI. These values translate to required revenues at the plant gate (i.e., before transportation) of $61.62 
and $35.85 per barrel bitumen, respectively.10 These estimates are consistent with estimates from Alberta 
Energy Regulator (2018), which reported a required WTI range of $75-85 per barrel for mines and $45-55 
per barrel for in situ plants. These high trigger prices clearly indicate why new development of Canada’s 
oil sands have slowed significantly since 2015.  
Despite the drop in oil prices in late 2014, work on Canadian oil sands projects currently under 
construction has continued and those that began before the oil price crash are expected to enter production 
at close to their original schedules. Given the substantial sunk costs, expected oil prices would have to fall 
significantly from current levels for those projects currently under construction to be abandoned or 
operating projects to shut down. More specifically, using an analysis similar to the one used to estimate 
the costs of new oil sands production, we find that while a new in situ project would not be developed 
unless average oil prices were expected to remain above $58 per barrel, price expectations would have to 
drop below $45 per barrel to trigger the suspension of a project for which two-thirds of the construction 
costs had already been incurred. Other than projects currently under construction, the lowest-cost future 
development would be expansion of some existing facilities.  For example, Ollenberger et al. (2016) find 
                                                     
9 Appendix Table 1 presents a list of the assumptions underlying these estimates and Appendix Table 2 presents the 
detailed cost estimates. 
10 This includes the costs of diluting and shipping a barrel of bitumen and the discount at which diluted 
bitumen trades to lighter oil blends. 
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that significant expansions of both existing in situ and oil sands projects are viable at average WTI prices 
below $50 per barrel.  Our model predicts that a prototypical expansion of an in situ project would be 
viable at approximately $50 per barrel, depending on the assumed reduction in total capital costs due to 
already-sunk costs. 
 
GETTING PRODUCT TO MARKET: TRANSPORT CHALLENGES 
The analysis just presented does not consider the evolving challenges to the large-scale 
transportation of oil sands product to markets, particularly for export. We discuss these challenges here.  
Alberta Energy Regulator (2018) reports that of the 2.7 million barrels per day of total oil sands 
production in Alberta in 2017, 375,000 barrels per day were used within the province, while 650,000 
barrels per day of upgraded oil sands product and 1.5 million barrels per day of non-upgraded bitumen 
were removed from Alberta.11 The latter includes product shipped to US markets and to Canadian 
markets outside the province. Most of these volumes move by pipeline, although some exports occur by 
rail.12 
Export capacity is extremely tight. In December 2017, the largest export pipeline systems, 
Keystone (27%), Enbridge Mainline (5-21%), and Trans-Mountain (23%), were all over-subscribed (by 
the percentages shown in brackets) relative to their maximum capacity (NEB, 2018). Although pipeline 
expansions are underway in the Enbridge system, even a conservative production growth case would lead 
to export volumes exceeding effective pipeline capacity unless additional new pipeline projects are 
undertaken (NEB, 2017).  
                                                     
11 We use “removals” to indicate movements out of the province, including volumes shipped to other 
Canadian provinces. We use exports to denote shipments to destinations outside of Canada. 




The construction of new oil sands pipelines has been a key issue in North America. Pipeline 
safety concerns were exacerbated by two spills of oil sands diluted bitumen (in Kalamazoo, Michigan and 
Mayflower, Arkansas in 2010 and 2013, respectively). These safety concerns, coupled with concerns 
about greenhouse gas emissions, resulted in increased opposition to pipelines, culminating in the US with 
President Obama’s rejection of the Keystone XL pipeline (in late 2015) and in Canada with major 
political battles and protests over pipeline proposals. Although President Trump reversed the Obama 
administration decision on Keystone XL in 2017, the pipeline continues to face regulatory challenges and 
stiff local opposition.  
Several other pipeline projects have been proposed to increase capacity to ship oil derived from 
the Alberta oil sands. The TransMountain Expansion (590k bbl/d) to the Canadian West Coast and the 
Line 3 refurbishment and Line 67 expansion of the Enbridge system to the US Midwest (370k bbl/d) have 
received Canadian regulatory approval.13  The proposed Northern Gateway Pipeline (525k bbl/d) to the 
Canadian West Coast had its federal regulatory approval overturned by the courts and was subsequently 
denied by the Canadian government in 2016 (Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, (2016), Government of Canada 
(2016)).  The Energy East (1100k bbl/d) pipeline, the only proposed oil pipeline to the Canadian East 
coast, was cancelled and withdrawn from the regulatory process by TransCanada in 2017. 
Shipping by rail presents the only plausible alternative to transport by pipeline.  In general, 
shipping oil by rail costs substantially more per barrel-mile than shipping by pipeline. However, there are 
factors related to specific characteristics of the transportation of oil sands bitumen that narrow the gap 
between pipeline and rail costs. The most important of these is that shipping bitumen by rail requires less 
dilution, thus reducing both the total volume of product shipped and the costs attributable to purchase of 
the diluting agent. Estimates of the per-barrel cost advantage of pipelines over rail vary from $3-$4 (U.S. 
Department of State, 2014) to $9 (TransCanada, 2016).  Without new pipeline capacity, it is widely 
expected that oil sands production will be lower than would otherwise be the case, because net revenues 
                                                     
13 Note that construction is underway on Line 3. 
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will be lower if incremental production must rely on shipments by rail.  For example, National Energy 
Board (2016a) estimates that a scenario with no new pipelines constructed would lead to an 8% reduction 
in total Canadian oil output, and a 13% (400,000 barrel per day) reduction in peak oil sands output. These 
findings are driven by an estimated reduction of $9.20 in the price of diluted bitumen at the Hardisty, 
Alberta hub.  The U.S. Department of State (2014) found similar results concerning oil price levels in 
their analysis of the Keystone XL pipeline. Given these results, we recalculated our model results for a 
scenario with higher discounts for Canadian diluted bitumen and find that these discounts have significant 
impacts. More specifically, we find that under the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Reference 
Case for oil prices, a $9 per barrel additional discount on Canadian crude would reduce the rates of return 
on in situ projects from 17% to 13% and on mining projects from 8% to 5.5%.  
Whether reached by pipeline or rail, the United States represents the most important market for 
any additional exports of Canadian oil sands production.14  In 2017, Canada exported 2.7 million barrels 
per day of heavy crudes (including diluted bitumen) to the US via pipeline, which represented 56% of 
total US imports of this grade of crude oil (Energy Information Administration, 2017). Thus, there is 
significant potential to increase shipments of non-upgraded bitumen to the US.  Although there are other 
markets for heavier crudes such as those produced from oil sands, the US market remains the closest 
major market and is therefore likely to be served first.  
 
CANADIAN OIL SANDS AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES 
Climate change policies in Canada, the United States, and globally are evolving rapidly. As a 
producer of a carbon-based product, Canada’s oil sands sector – and its future prospects -- will clearly be 
affected by these policies. 
Climate Impact 
                                                     
14 Other potential markets include India and China, which could be served from the West or East coasts. 
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Operations in the Canadian oil sands affect greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in two ways. One is 
the emissions generated in the process of extraction, processing, and transport. The other is the release of 
carbon when the product is finally used. 
Oil sands operations in Alberta are a large and growing source of GHG emissions, with emissions 
increasing from 15.3 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 1990 to 69.3 MtCO2e 
by 2016 (Environment Canada, 2018a).  Oil sands accounted for 10.2% of total GHG emissions in 
Canada in 2016, and are projected to increase to 15.9% (115 MtCO2e) of total Canadian emissions  by 
2030 (Environment Canada, 2018b). 
Moreover, oil refined from oil sands has higher life-cycle emissions than comparable products 
produced from most other crude sources (Brandt 2011; Bergerson et al., 2012; Cai et al., 2015; Gordon et 
al., 2015). More specifically, the California Air Resources Board (2015) estimates the carbon intensity 
values for refined products derived from Western Canada Select (the heavy oil blend price we have used 
to proxy for diluted bitumen values) to be 18.43 grams per megajoule (g/MJ), which is much greater than 
the 12.03g/MJ estimated for WTI crude and the 8.71g/MJ estimated for North Dakota Bakken crude. The 
estimated carbon intensity of products sourced via oil sands production also varies significantly across 
facilities, ranging from 12.05g/MJ for Kearl Lake bitumen to 37.29g/MJ for Long Lake synthetic. This 
suggests that depending on how it is differentiated by source, carbon pricing applied to oil users could 
disproportionately affect the attractiveness of oil sands in general, and the output of facilities generating 
more carbon intensive output in particular. 
 Significant concerns have been raised about the impact of oil sands emissions on global climate 
change. Sometimes this has involved emotional language. For example, Hansen (2012) characterized the 
exploitation of oil sands resources as “game over for the climate,” and high-profile environmentalist Bill 
McKibben (2011) has called oil sands “the biggest carbon bomb on the planet.” The findings in the peer-
reviewed literature have been less definitive on the potential role of oil sands extraction in exacerbating 
global climate change. Swart and Weaver (2012) find that if extracted and combusted, the entire oil sands 
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resource would increase global average temperatures by 0.36oC, and that combustion of current oil sands 
reserves15 would increase global average temperatures by 0.03oC. 
Implications of Climate Policy for the Oil Sands Sector  
Existing research is also mixed concerning the future of oil sands development if the world takes 
serious action on climate change.  For example, McGlade and Ekins (2015) find that under cost-effective 
policies to reduce GHG emissions to levels consistent with a 2oC increase in global mean temperature, 
there would be no new oil sands development and existing production would be rapidly curtailed, with 
cumulative production falling sharply from the NEB (2016b) forecasts (i.e., from 38 billion barrels by 
2040 to 7.5 billion barrels by 2050).  Under similar global emissions constraints, McGlade and Ekins 
(2014) find that future oil sand production rates depend on whether carbon capture technology (CCS) is 
readily available.16  With CCS, production rates would increase to 4.1 million barrels per day in 2035, 
while remaining roughly constant at current levels if CCS technology is not viable.  Chan et al. (2012) 
find that bitumen production increases 4-fold in the absence of global action on climate policies but that, 
“climate policy significantly dampens the prospects for Canadian oil sands development because global 
demand and the producer prices of oil are depressed, and the Canadian CO2 policy adds to the cost oil 
sands production.”  Leach and Boskovic (2014) find that oil sands production is likely to continue under a 
global carbon price set at the social cost of carbon if and only if a significant share of the carbon cost is 
borne by oil consumers.17 
                                                     
15 This is estimated to be approximately 100 years of production at 5 million barrels per day, which is just 
below the peak rate forecast in NEB (2016a). 
16 CCS is the process of capturing waste carbon dioxide from large point sources, transporting it to a 
storage site, and depositing it where it will not enter the atmosphere, normally in an underground geological 
formation.  
17 The social cost of carbon is an estimate of the monetized damages caused by a one tonne increase in 
carbon omitted in a year. 
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While it is likely that global action on climate change would preclude significant expansion of oil 
sands production in the absence of significant technological advances, it is more difficult to assess the 
impact of climate change policies on the viability of existing projects in Canada.  Higher domestic carbon 
prices have impacts that are analogous to lower oil prices or higher transportation costs, although with 
slightly different royalty implications. Carbon costs are deductible from both the tax and royalty base, so 
approximately 50% of any increased carbon cost is effectively passed-through to provincial and federal 
governments through reduced tax and royalty payments (Leach and Boskovic, 2014).  
The production-weighted average emissions per barrel produced from oil sands (using 2014 
Alberta government data) was 0.055 metric tons per barrel (t/bbl). This means that each dollar in average 
carbon cost would increase the average cost of existing oil sands production by $.055 per barrel, 
suggesting that it is likely that existing operations could withstand significant increases in domestic 
carbon prices without inducing a significant shut-down of operations. 
Overall Impact of Climate Policies 
Overall, we find that the impact of evolving climate policies on oil sands development is likely to 
be felt most acutely through the impacts of these policies on global oil prices. Since roughly 80% of the 
total life cycle emissions from the production and combustion of a barrel of bitumen occurs in refining, 
transportation, and final combustion, the impact of downstream emissions pricing will likely be greater 
than the impact of policies affecting only production emissions. This suggests that the greatest climate 
policy risks for oil sands are from the oil market impacts of global action on climate change, not domestic 
climate change policies. 
 
OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES FACING CANADIAN OIL SANDS 
In addition to climate impact, there are there are important local environmental and ecological 
impacts related to oil sands production, including the accumulation of mine tailings, land reclamation, and 
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negative impacts on populations of caribou and other fauna.18 In this section, we discuss these issues in 
more detail as well as potential government actions aimed mitigating them. 
Accumulation of Mine Tailings 
After oil sands have been mined, the ore is mixed with hot water and chemical solvents to 
separate bitumen from sand, clay, and other impurities. The resulting slurry goes through an extraction 
process to remove the bitumen. The remaining components are called tailings. Tailings are transported 
and stored in large ‘ponds’ – engineered systems that involve dams and dykes. In 2015, tailings ponds in 
Alberta contained 1.18 trillion of fluid tailings and covered more than 220 square kilometres (McNeill 
and Lothian, 2017). The appropriate management of these tailings, which contain many compounds that 
are potentially harmful to the environment, is a major issue for the oil sands sector. 
Environmental impacts 
Tailings have a number of potential environmental impacts. The Council of Canadian 
Academies19 (2015) identified problems that can arise from toxic seepage into groundwater and rivers and 
the potential ecological implications of catastrophic dyke failures. However, empirical evidence 
concerning these impacts is rather limited. In one exception, Kelly et al (2010) provide evidence linking 
elevated levels of thirteen important pollutants in the Athabasca river system in northeastern Alberta to oil 
sands operations, including tailings. In the longer term, the extent to which successful reclamation of land 
                                                     
18 It is important to note that oil sands operations are concentrated in the northeastern corner of Alberta, a 
remote area where few people live or visit.  Thus, justification for governmental regulation of environmental and 
ecological impacts must often be based on non-use values (i.e., the value that people assign to goods, including 
public goods, even though they have never and will never directly use them). 
19 The Council of Canadian Academies is a highly respected not-for-profit organization that conducts 
expert evidence reviews in support of public policy development in Canada. It includes three member academies: 




contaminated by tailings is likely to be feasible, and at what cost, is also disputed (Pembina Institute, 
2008). 
There is also comparatively little evidence concerning the contribution of tailings facilities to air 
pollution, and the likely associated impacts. However, Galarneau et al. (2014) find that tailings ponds are 
a much more significant source of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), which can negatively 
impact human health, than previously believed. Moreover, the environmental implications of such 
discharges for regional ecosystems are not well-understood. 
Government policies 
Tailings are a classic stock pollution problem. Research and policy work have examined options 
for both stemming the rate of deposition of new tailings and reducing the stock as part of efforts to 
reclaim the affected landscape.20 In an effort to slow the generation of tailings, the Alberta Energy 
Regulator regulates oil sands producers to encourage reduced tailings deposition. 
Although the underlying physical science regarding the short and longer term impacts of tailings 
on the environment of Alberta remains under-developed, attempts to actually monetise or otherwise 
weigh those impacts in a way that could be included in a benefit-cost analysis is essentially non-existent. 
This points to an urgent need to support further research in this area to provide credible estimates of 
impacts in a form that can support policy evaluation and appraisal. 
Reclamation of Tailings and Mine Sites 
Oil sands companies are responsible for restoration of their sites after use. This includes tailings 
areas and land used for other purposes. There has been some progress in the remediation of existing 
tailings ponds.  Suncor Energy became the first oil sands company to complete surface reclamation of a 
                                                     
20 In terms of flow, the production of 1 barrel of synthetic crude oil requires approximately 2.5 barrels of 
water and 2 tonnes of oil sands ore, yielding around 3.3 barrels of raw tailings. While much of the water used is 
recycled from existing tailings ponds, the long-run equilibrium sees approximately 2 barrels of mature fine tailings 
produced for every barrel of oil (Hrudey et al., 2010).   
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tailings pond. Reclaiming the 220 hectare site north of Fort McMurray involved moving over 65,000 
truck-loads of soil and the planting of around 630,000 trees and shrubs (Marketwire, 2010)). However, 
the success of that project -- i.e., the extent to which the area returns to being a self-sustaining ecosystem -
- can only be assessed with the passage of time. Other reclamation technologies are in the test phase, and 
thus not yet commercially viable. 
There has also been significant work on the reclamation of oil sands mine sites, although the 
actual rate of reclamation is low.  The total oil sands extraction area in Alberta is roughly 89,000 hectares, 
with only about 8,000 hectares of that at some stage of reclamation.  Only 237.6 hectares of land (less 
than 0.5% of the total disturbed landscape) have been certified as reclaimed and returned to government 
jurisdiction (Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017), indicating a substantial challenge for land restoration in the 
future.  
There is significant research on the technical challenges to restoring oil sands landscapes to their 
original productive capacity after oil extraction has been completed (e.g., see Hrudey et al., 2010). In 
addition to the challenges of reclaiming lands currently used as tailings ponds, reclamation of fenland, 
muskeg swamp, and boreal forest landscape have all proven challenging. From an economic standpoint, 
we found nothing on the relative value of land restored to a productive but not fully-restored landscape. 
In order to provide financial assurance of reclamation, companies must provide security deposits 
to the Government of Alberta to ensure the work is done.  More specifically, companies are allowed to 
use the value of their extraction assets, which is a function of the price of oil, as collateral for their 
unfunded future reclamation liabilities.  As of September 2017, the Government of Alberta held just 
under $1 billion in financial security (Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017), compared to the most recent 
public estimate of liability of $20.8 billion (Office of the Auditor General of Alberta 2015). Going 
forward, as with the decommissioning costs related to nuclear power projects, the future costs of restoring 
the oil sands areas of Alberta (after production ends), and the extent to which partial restoration will be 




Impacts on Caribou and Other Fauna 
The negative impact of oil sands on faunal biodiversity has drawn significant media and public 
attention.  The plight of the woodland caribou, in particular, has received a great deal of attention 
(Hervieux et al., 2013).21 
Alberta is home to fifteen herds of woodland caribou, and the caribou is listed as a threatened 
species under the Canadian Species at Risk Act.  This regulation requires both the identification of key 
threats and the development of an intervention plan (Environment Canada, 2012).  Oil sands operations 
have been identified as factors in the decline of woodland caribou, but the magnitude of this influence is 
disputed.  Hrudey et al. (2010) highlight the role of habitat fragmentation. Roads – many developed or 
used primarily for oil sands business – act as semi-permeable barriers to caribou movement and pipeline 
rights of way allow predator movement into caribou territory (Dyer et al. 2002; Jordaan et al., 2009).   
Boutin et al. (2012) suggest a multi-stage process in which human disturbance in the oil sands region has 
led to habitat fragmentation and to increases in the deer population, which in turn has led to an increase in 
wolf populations.  Latham et al. (2011a, 2011b) find that wolves’ use of road and pipeline rights-of-way 
for movement has changed the predator-prey balance in a way that puts caribou at a disadvantage. 
In June 2016, the Alberta Government introduced its Caribou Action Plan, which includes several 
proposed actions to ensure caribou recovery (Government of Alberta, 2016). The current policy includes 
the expansion of protected areas as well as predator control, specifically through the culling of wolves.  
Schneider et al. (2010) recommend a three-pronged approach to management -- habitat protection, 
restoration of disturbed areas, and predator control.  Boutin et al. (2012) argue that although unpopular, 
                                                     
21 Two studies have used stated preference methods to estimate the value of the existence of 
caribou (Adamowicz et al., 1998; Harper, 2012).  The estimated willingness-to-pay for an increase in the 
number of herds is approximately $CAD 184 (to increase from two to three herds) or $CAD 268 (to 




the wolf culls are necessary because the other two approaches will not eliminate the causes of population 
decline in time to preserve viable herds.   
Policies aimed at protecting caribou also affect the economics of oil sands. Boskovic and 
Nostbakken (2016a) find that, on average, regulations designed to protect caribou decrease the value of 
oil sands lands by 24% on average, or $CAD 192 per hectare, leading to a $CAD 1.15 billion reduction in 
government leases and royalties.  Boskovic and Nostbakken (2016b) examine the impact on lands likely 
to see future regulation, finding that the value of leases in currently unregulated areas decreases by an 
average of 16% relative to geologically similar leases further from caribou protected areas. For areas 
within 5km of a currently regulated area, the value of the lease decreases by 22%. 
In summary, oil sand operations may have important impacts on both the health of caribou 
populations and other fauna in Alberta. However, we found little or no economic analysis that allowed for 
these impacts to be included in a benefit-cost framework.  
 
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS  
Next we examine the impacts of Alberta’s oil sands sector on the wider economy. The channels 
for positive macroeconomic impacts are clear: employment, government revenues, and real wages in 
Alberta all increased well above national averages from the early 2000s through mid-2014, and  wages, 
productivity, and employment in Alberta were still well above national averages in 2017. However, there 
is a substantial literature that suggests that large resource endowments may have negative macroeconomic 
impacts on a jurisdiction and actually lower its well-being; some of these negative impacts have been 
studied in Alberta. Two concepts that have often been discussed in this regard are the resource curse and 
Dutch disease. 
The Resource Curse 
Potentially the most pervasive of these macro-economic impacts, the “resource curse” describes a 
deleterious effect of increased resource wealth on governance, educational attainment and other socio-
economic impacts.  Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) and others have identified several channels through 
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which the resource curse can occur.  For example, the lure of significant wealth associated with the 
resource bounty induces rent-seeking behaviour, often on the part of political actors;  this effect is likely 
to be particularly pronounced when there are weak legal institutions (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008).  
Some have argued that such an effect has occurred in Alberta, pointing in particular to successive 
governments’ decisions to spend resource revenue for current consumption rather than saving it to a 
sovereign fund, as has been done in Norway (Parlee, 2015).22 
Dutch Disease 
Another possible negative macroeconomic effect of a large resource endowment is the “Dutch 
Disease,” whereby the presence of significant potential rents pulls resources away from other sectors.  In 
particularly dramatic cases, the other sectors wither (Economist, 1977).  Sachs and Warner (1995) find 
that Dutch Disease can be a source of anemic growth, “if there is something special about the sources of 
growth in manufacturing.”  Here the market failure would be sector-level returns to scale that are not 
accounted for in individual decisions. Two questions remain un-answered in the debate over the potential 
rise of Dutch Disease in Canada: first, did an additional decline in manufacturing occur as a result of the 
rise in resources and second, does this substitution of economic activity away from manufacturing matter?   
There is fairly compelling evidence indicating an accelerated decline in traditional manufacturing 
in Canada, as the resource boom pulled resources into oil sands, causing an increase in prices of key 
related inputs and wages. There is also evidence that the appreciation of the Canadian dollar, in part due 
to the commodity boom, accelerated this transition. For example, Beine, Bos and Coulombe (2012) 
estimate that 42% of the substantial appreciation in the Canadian dollar between 2002 and 2008 was due 
to the increased value of resource exports, especially, but not uniquely, oil sands. They also find that 31% 
                                                     
22 There is some evidence that educational attainment and the accumulation of human capital is adversely 
affected by resource booms (Parlee, 2015).  However, Emery et al. (2012) found that although the oil boom in 
Alberta between 1973-1981 changed the timing of schooling, it did not affect total human capital accumulation over 
the long term. 
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(approximately 100,000 jobs) of all manufacturing job losses during the same period can be attributed to 
the rise in the exchange rate driven by Canadian economic activity.  Krzepkopwski and Mintz (2013) 
argue that the declines observed in the manufacturing sector are the continuing result of factors other than 
the resource boom and suggest that, with or without the oil sands industry, the high-wage manufacturing 
jobs which had been the mainstay of central Canada’s economy for decades were unlikely to return. 
Boadway et al. (2013) take a different approach, examining whether Canada’s institutions of 
fiscal redistribution have the capacity to deal with resource booms. They recommend changes to the 
system through which resource rents are collected and redistributed within the country and through 
increased infrastructure spending in other regions to offset the economic pull of resource-rich regions; 
they also encourage more saving of resource rents in sovereign wealth funds. 
Thus, the literature consistently finds significant macroeconomic impacts of the oil sands boom, 
and more generally finds an increase in the overall standard of living, which is provided by the increase in 
natural resource wealth and activity due to the oil sands boom, at least since the early 2000s. However, 
the literature also finds significant transition and volatility costs, institutional failure, and a potential long-
term impact of lost educational attainment due to the resource boom.  It is important to further estimate 
the value of these impacts, but some values will only become clear in the longer term. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This article has discussed key issues in the economics of Canadian oil sands. We find that 
production from Canadian oil sands requires that the WTI oil price exceed $58 per barrel. While the oil 
price was markedly lower for a period of time, it has recently risen above $60, suggesting the potential for 
substantial increases in oil sands production. We also find significant uncertainty due to potential 
transportation constraints. If currently proposed pipeline projects do not proceed, for example because of 
legal hurdles and local regulatory processes, the required price to trigger investment in new oil sands 
projects is approximately $9 per barrel higher than would otherwise be the case. Regarding the non-
market costs associated with oil sands, there has been insufficient economic analysis concerning air 
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quality, water quality, wildlife, and other environmental impacts. This gap in the literature presents a 
substantial challenge to conducting a thorough benefit-cost analysis of Canadian oil sands. 
Due to space limitations, we have not discussed water quality and quantity policies (Allen, 2008; 
Schindler and Donahue, 2006); issues concerning airborne pollution deposition on land and water (Kelly 
et al., 2010); and oil sands’ contribution to particulate matter and acid-rain-causing pollution (Hrudey et 
al., 2010).  We have also omitted discussion of the complex relationship between Canada’s First Nations 
and oil sands development. Many First Nations and Metis communities in the oil sands area have 
important commercial relationships with oil sands companies, and many First Nations communities have 
been supportive of proposed pipeline projects. However, there are also multiple legal actions by First 
Nations communities against oil sands operations, against the provincial governments for violations of 
historic treaty rights, and against pipeline projects currently under development.  
If global oil prices continue to recover, oil sands production may be poised to play an increasing 
role in global markets. However, any expansion of oil sands is likely to lead to a host of external effects, 
including climate impacts, adverse impacts on local flora and fauna, and externalities associated with 
transportation.23  On the other hand, increased production will add to the consumer surplus in downstream 
petroleum markets, and the associated expansion is likely to generate benefits to local economies. A full 
and careful comparison of these costs and benefits would be both timely and important. Our hope is that 
the discussions in this article will encourage such an analysis. 
  
                                                     
23 If pipeline capacity does not expand to keep pace with production, the increased production will most 
likely be shipped via rail; in turn, this increase in rail traffic is likely to yield external costs related to safety (Mason, 





Appendix Table 1 Key model parameters, project cost, and fiscal policy assumptions  
 
 
Appendix Table 2: Estimates of oil sands supply costs  
Notes: The Current Prices and Policies scenarios rely on WTI and Henry Hub natural gas 60-month forward curves as 
well as the 60-month forward curve for the Canadian dollar exchange rate as of March 22, 2018. The Reference, High Oil, 
and Low Oil Price cases are from EIA (2018). All commodity prices are in $US. Henry Hub natural gas prices are 
converted to Alberta Energy Company/Nova Energy Transfer (AECO/NIT) hub prices using a $0.50/GJ discount.  
Beyond 2023, forward curve prices for oil and natural gas are treated as constant in real terms and exchange rates are 





Project parameters In situ Mine Time trends In situ Mine
Capacity (barrels per day) 40000 180000 Inflation
Build time (yrs) 3 4 Long term bond rate (for royalty calculation) 
Total years of production 30 50 Fuel use (diesel, natural gas) improvement per barrel
Cumulative production (million barrels) 385 3180 Emissions intensity improvement (ex fuel)
Costs ($CAD 2018) Tax pool allocations for capital expenditure
Construction Costs (millions) 1350 16200
Maintenance Costs ($ per barrel) 5 3
Operating Costs ($ per barrel) 10 16 15% 5%
Recurring Capital Costs ($ per barrel) 9 6
Deemed expenses for future reclamation  ($ per barrel)
Taxes
GHG Emissions (Carbon Dioxide Equivalent) Combined Corporate Tax Rate
Production emissions intensity (tonnes/barrel) 0.058 0.038
Life cycle emissions (grams/bbl) 575 535 Royalties Gross Net
Light oil life cycle emissions (grams/bbl) 500 Minimum Royalty Rate 1% 25%
Maximum Royalty Rate 9% 40%
Greenhouse Gas Policies Lower limit, formula - C$/bbl
Carbon price ($/tonne real) Upper limit, formula - C$/bbl
Output-based allocation rate (where applicable, t/bbl) 0.055 0.035
Carbon price escalation (annual increase in real price)









Canadian Oil and Gas Development Expense (30% of 
declining balance deductible each year)





















Internal Rate of Return (%) 8.79% N/A 16.93% 7.96% 33.48% 18.78% -5.08% N/A 12.71% 5.56%
Supply Cost (WTI equivalent $/bbl) 58.06        84.62        67.70        109.13      68.47        109.54      52.94        84.37        77.59        119.40      
Supply Cost (plant gate bitumen $/bbl) 35.85        61.61        41.24        81.43        41.99        81.84        32.03        62.51        41.68        82.24        
Total Revenue 41.00        40.95        74.02        83.66        190.90      219.54      25.92        31.56        60.88        70.52        
Capital and Debt Costs 12.99        10.24        12.76        11.34        12.76        11.34        12.76        11.34        12.76        11.34        
Operating Costs 15.34        32.96        16.69        35.60        17.94        42.51        17.41        33.58        16.69        35.60        
GHG Compliance Costs 0.20         0.41         0.20         0.41         0.20         0.41         0.20         0.41         -           -           
Royalties 4.84         3.08         17.83        15.33        64.31        66.61        0.97         2.06         0.20         0.41         
Taxes 2.56         -           7.66         6.09         26.31        26.99        -           -           12.82        10.53        
Free Cash Flow 5.06         (5.74)        18.89        14.88        69.37        71.69        (5.41)        (15.83)       5.47         3.96         
WTI Crude Oil at Cushing ($/bbl)
Natural Gas at AECO/NIT ($/MMBtu)
Diluted Bitumen at Hardisty ($/bbl)
Bitumen value at plant gate ($/bbl)
Diluted bitumen discount to WTI ($/bbl)
$CAD/$US
Revenues and Costs ($CAD 2018 per bbl bitumen)
Key Commodity Price Assumptions ($2018)
Project Financial Indicators
12.86 12.77 12.77 10.11 21.75
43.10 89.50 218.44 31.70 80.52
33.81 78.45 203.52
1.22 1.03 1.03 1.30 1.03
24.12 65.62
55.96 102.27 231.21 41.81 102.27
2.50 4.46 5.81 3.98 4.46
Projects under EIA 
(2018) Reference Case, 
Current Policies, High 
Differential
Oil sands supply costs and financial 
metrics
Projects under current 
prices and policies
Projects under EIA 
(2018) Reference Case 
Prices, Current 
Policies
Projects under EIA 
(2018) High Oil Price 
Case, Current Policies
Projects under EIA 





Figure 1 Mined and in situ bitumen production from 1967 through 2017 and projections from 2018 through 2027.  
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